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Editorial 
The evolution and widespread adoption of technology is opening new and exciting ways to improve our lives with 
better products and services as well as better and more frequent human contact. Unfortunately, these changes also 
present criminals with new opportunities. We know from experience that these adversaries can be intelligent, well-
equipped and creative, and they will find and take advantage of any technological or human weakness in our 
defenses. These developments are also significant for insurers underwriting these emergent risks. 
The issue is especially critical for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in Switzerland, who are often at the leading 
edge of market development and innovation but have limited resources to devote to cyber security. The last few 
years have demonstrated just how much these companies are in the crosshairs of cyber criminals. At Allianz Suisse, 
we have always supported our customers with excellent products, tailored services, and ground-breaking solutions, 
and this new study is in keeping with our record of innovation. 
The attitude of employees towards cyber risks is a critical component of a company’s overall protection and 
response mechanism. The Zurich University of Applied Sciences (ZHAW) has developed an exciting research focus 
on customer behavior in insurance, and we are glad to be associated with this research. This study, in particular, 
has identified interesting behavioral and cultural insights into SME employee attitudes and developed clear and 
insightful recommendations for the companies themselves as well as for their technology and insurance providers. 









Cyber attacks are an increasingly significant issue for Swiss SMEs. About one third have already experienced cyber 
attacks, and four percent have been blackmailed as a result. Most of these problems began with phishing attacks, 
where criminal elements gained access to the IT system by exploiting an employee error or oversight. We 
interviewed several employees of Swiss SMEs to understand how their attitudes towards cyber attacks may affect 
this vulnerability and to develop practical suggestions for corrective action. The interviews were conducted using 
deep metaphors to understand the hidden cultural and emotional drivers of behavior rather than the rational, visible 
components. We developed three recommendations to take advantage of the proactive culture at SMEs and 
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Introduction 
1.1. CYBER RISKS AND THE SWISS SME 
Data or security breaches, espionage, hacker attacks, ransomware, denial of service, and employee errors are the 
leading causes of cyber incidents, and they are becoming more common and increasingly costly. This development 
is reflected in the Allianz Risk Barometer (2020), to which more than 2,700 risk experts worldwide contributed: 
Cyber incidents have displaced business interruption as the top risk. The increasing interconnectedness of the 
economy means that companies are becoming more vulnerable to cyber attacks, and reports of spectacular hacker 
attacks and data thefts are growing. Companies are threatened with damages running into millions, the loss of 
image, and even a business interruption that threatens their existence if cyber criminals steal data, smuggle 
malicious programs into networks, or paralyze servers (Allianz, 2020). Severin Moser, CEO at Allianz Suisse, 
estimates that the consequences of cyber crime cost the global economy more than US$ 600 billion per year (NZZ, 
2019). However, it is difficult to quantify the development in detail due to a lack of reliable figures and many 
unreported cases. The Cyber Risk Working Group at the Swiss Insurance Association estimates the annual cost in 
Switzerland alone to be CHF 9.5 billion, and the figure is rising (SIA, 2018).  
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), defined as companies employing up to 250 people, make up more 
than 99% of companies and provide two-thirds of the jobs in Switzerland (Federal Statistical Office, 2020). They 
play a crucial role in the Swiss economy and are heavily affected by cyber attacks. About a third of Swiss SMEs 
have already experienced cyber attacks, and some four percent have been blackmailed as a result of these attacks 
(Mändli Lerch and Repic, 2017). Even if the data from smaller companies are of little interest to cyber criminals, 
these companies remain attractive targets for two reasons: First, for extorting a ransom using ransomware, and 
second, as a gateway for attacking larger companies working with the SMEs (Heer, 2020). The Reporting and 
Analysis Center for Information Assurance, which was integrated into the National Center for Cybersecurity (NCSC) 
in July 2020, reported an increased risk from ransomware attacks in early 2020 (MELANI, 2020a). This threat 
continues to grow, and having quadrupled in 2019, it is now the most common cyber incident (Trustwave, 2020). 
There are numerous examples of Swiss companies falling victim to ransomware attacks, and four of them are 
discussed in the following chapter. 
Recent studies have started to look at cyber attacks on SMEs in more detail in neighboring countries. Dreissigacker 
et al. (2020) estimate that in Germany, for example, 40 to 50 percent of SMEs with more than ten employees are 
exposed to a cyber attack each year, even if most of these attacks are neutralized and do not cause any harm. This 
figure is lower, though not significantly, than that for larger companies, which are attacked at a rate of 50 to 60 
percent per year. This study further investigates the yearly rate for each major category of cyber attack, as 
summarized in Figure 1. SMEs can expect a phishing attack every four years and a ransomware attack every seven, 
roughly in line with the rates for larger companies. On the other hand, CEO fraud attacks and manual hacking are 
significantly lower for SMEs, perhaps due to the more hands-on role of the CEO in smaller companies and the 
potentially lower financial gain. Studies in other European countries report similar results but sometimes with 
significant deviations, though a direct comparison is difficult because of different research methodologies and 
reporting mechanisms. In general, however, they confirm a substantial overall threat to SMEs from cyber attacks. 
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Figure 1: Estimated yearly rate of cyber attacks on SMEs 
ESTIMATED RATE OF CYBER ATTACKS ON SMES PER YEAR BY TYPE IN GERMANY 2018/2019 
 
 
Source: Dreissigacker et al. (2020) 
 
Malevolent cyber actors regularly adapt social engineering attacks, especially phishing, to current major events 
such as sports events or the current COVID-19 pandemic. However, practically all common malware families have 
been spread with a COVID-19 pretext, most commonly using emails with a contaminated attachment or a link to an 
infected website (MELANI, 2020b). The number of phishing emails has soared during the pandemic; for example, 
scammers impersonating World Health Organization (WHO) employees have targeted relief funds for COVID-19 
victims and lured users to malicious websites using fake advertisements (de Moura et al., 2020). Phishing attacks 
have also been aimed specifically at the changed work environment. Many users were initially unfamiliar with 
conference and collaboration software, and the messages sent by these platforms, making phishing emails more 
difficult to recognize (MELANI, 2020b). Several articles identify the vulnerabilities of companies due to human error 
and the significance of phishing attacks. While the technical infrastructure remains critical, employees often fall prey 
to cleverly devised schemes and expose their companies to fraud or malware (Pugnetti et al., 2019). Swiss SMEs 
are generally under-protected against cyber risks, especially concerning services for mitigation and recovery 
(Pugnetti and Schneebeli, 2020). 
This research aims to understand potential vulnerabilities due to employee perceptions of cyber crime and SME 
company culture and to develop suggestions for coping mechanisms for use by companies as well as training and 
services that can be provided by third parties. 
 
1.2. EXAMPLES OF PROMINENT CYBER ATTACKS IN SWITZERLAND 
There have been several cases of cyber attacks against Swiss SMEs reported in the media. Four attacks were 
particularly relevant for the companies interviewed in this study and are described below in some detail. 
1.2.1. OFFIX AG, 2019 
OFFIX AG, which operates in the office equipment sector, employing some 250 people and with a turnover of CHF 
300 million (Papedis, n.d.), was the victim of a ransomware attack on 15 May 2019 (Jochum, 2019). It is assumed 
that a hacker intercepted email correspondence with a customer and substituted the customer in the exchange. A 
company employee then received a certification request, clicked on the link provided, and the virus infected the 
company’s IT system. The first irregularities became apparent a day later, and, on 17 May, it became clear that in 
terms of IT, there was “nothing left”: databases had been deleted and numerous servers restored to factory settings. 
Many customer interfaces for order placement were also deleted, and OFFIX lost track of incoming orders and 
sales. A ransom of 45 bitcoins (at the time valued at CHF 350,000) was demanded for decryption. An external cyber 
Ransomware - 14% Spyware - 12% Other Malware - 22% Manual Hacking - 3%
Denial of Service - 7% Defacing - 3% CEO Fraud - 12% Phishing - 25%
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crime specialist was engaged, and the federal Reporting and Analysis Center for Information Assurance (MELANI) 
as well as the police were informed. Customers were then asked to place further orders via telephone, fax, or newly 
set up email addresses before the entire company went offline. Fortunately, the hacker had made a mistake, and, 
in addition, an important application had been saved on an external hard drive by an IT specialist only a few weeks 
previously. As a result, OFFIX managed to restore part of its database and could then rebuild its IT systems 
(Severin, 2019). According to the CEO, Martin Kelterborn, the financial damage could not be quantified, but the 
attack was “very, very expensive” (Jochum, 2019).  
1.2.2. Swisswindows, 2019 
In May 2019, Swisswindows, a window fitter with around 170 employees (Borkert, 2020), endured a production 
downtime of over a month due to a ransomware attack. Hackers had probably gained access to the company 
network through an inconspicuous email and encrypted all the company’s data. Orders were no longer visible, and 
employees had no access to customer and machine data. The company was paralyzed. An external IT company 
had run daily data backups, but the backup files were attached to the company server and were therefore also 
inaccessible. Although the cyber criminals demanded a large ransom in bitcoins to release the data, the company 
decided not to pay the ransom but to invest in replacing its IT infrastructure, which was necessary anyway (Klein, 
2020). However, in February 2020, the workforce was unexpectedly informed that the company was bankrupt. The 
cyber attack had further exacerbated an ongoing decline in the company’s core business activities and was, 
therefore, a contributing factor to its downfall (SRF, 2020).  
1.2.3. Meier Tobler, 2019 
Meier Tobler, the building technology company, with revenues of CHF 500 million and some 1,300 employees 
(Meier Tobler, 2020), suffered a ransomware attack in July 2019 (Luzerner Zeitung, 2019). Attackers gained access 
through an email attachment containing malware (Schäppi, 2020). The central SAP system, the warehouse control 
system, landline telephony, the website, and all email addresses stopped working (Lüscher and Niedermann, 2019). 
This had a significant impact on sales and profits as per the company’s press release:  
Although the prepared emergency procedures took effect and a provisional infrastructure could be set up within a short 
time, a temporary interruption in deliveries could not be prevented. This resulted in an immediate drop in sales in the 
trading business of around CHF 5 million. An additional loss of sales of a similar magnitude occurred later in the heat 
generation business due to the lack of availability of the IT systems.  
The direct extra cost of coping with the attack affected 2019 annual profits by CHF 1 million. The company has 
since rebuilt its IT infrastructure in accordance with the latest security criteria (Meier Tobler, 2020). 
1.2.4. Stadler Rail, 2020 
Stadler Rail manufactures rail vehicles, and with 11,000 employees and global revenues of over CHF 3.2 billion 
(Stadler Rail, 2020a), it is not an SME. However, this cyber attack was mentioned by people interviewed for this 
study, and it is therefore relevant. On May 7, 2020 “The Stadler IT network was attacked with malware. The 
company has immediately initiated the required security measures and it has involved the responsible authorities. 
A detailed investigation of the matter is ongoing.” (Stadler Rail, 2020b). The perpetrators blackmailed Stadler with 
the publication of stolen data and demanded payment of six million US dollars in bitcoin. The company confirmed 
in a statement to inside-it.ch that "These are confidential documents and data that were stolen from Stadler through 
criminal activities" (Anz, 2020). Stadler refused to pay the ransom, and some records were published to increase 
pressure, followed by the publication of more records as the company continued to refuse payment (Griesser Kym, 
2020). However, Stadler was at no time ready to respond to the demands of the blackmailers and make payments 
- and “will not do so” (Anz, 2020). 
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1.3. PROTECTING YOUR COMPANY 
All companies need to determine what risks they want to avoid, mitigate, transfer, or bear themselves as part of 
their risk management decision process. In this context, it is crucial to understand what insurance solutions are 
available to them and would have provided some level of protection in the cases described above. Cyber attacks 
can cause first-party losses, such as restoration costs for data, and interrupt regular business operations. Standard 
property insurance policies cover property damage and the resulting business interruption if the cause of the 
damage (e.g., a fire) is insured. However, property damage does not necessarily occur in the event of a cyber 
attack, and it is therefore rare for property insurance to be invoked. Furthermore, companies may be confronted 
with third-party liability claims after a cyber attack if, for example, customer data is leaked or deleted. Conventional 
third-party insurance covers liability claims from personal injury and property damage and the resulting financial 
loss. Third-party liability insurance covering a purely financial loss is usually only intended for specific professional 
groups and is, therefore, not widespread. 
The established, classic commercial insurance policies have one thing in common: they do not specifically address 
cyber risks. Under certain circumstances, the damage and effects of a cyber attack are insured through such 
products, but they are not explicitly designed to make cyber risk controllable for companies. It should be noted that 
cyber risks did not arise until the internet age, and the first cyber risk coverages were created around the turn of 
the millennium to address this new threat. In Switzerland, the first cyber risk policies were introduced by international 
insurers of large companies in 2015, and comprehensive insurance solutions for SMEs were launched in 2017. 
They usually contain third party liability, first-party losses, and crisis management, and also cover cyber crime / 
social engineering and cyber risk legal protection. The focus of these products is on cyber attacks as well as 
employee misconduct and data protection violations. In addition to paying for the damages incurred, companies 
receive access to a network of specialists in information technology, crisis communication, and legal protection to 
determine the extent of the damage, speed up damage repair, and avoid or mitigate damage to the company’s 
reputation. Table 1 provides an overview of currently available and customary cyber insurance coverages (Pugnetti 
et al., 2019). 
 
Table 1: Current cyber insurance coverages 
CURRENT CYBER INSURANCE COVERAGES 
Third-party liability 
Claims and demands from third parties 
- Data protection breaches 
- Loss of data 
- Misappropriation/loss of functionality  
- Digital communication 
- E-payment/contractual penalties 
- Forwarding of malware 
First-party losses 
Losses incurred by the policyholder 
- Restoration costs 
- Business interruption 
- Theft by cyber attack 
- Cyber blackmail 
- Official data protection procedures 
Crisis management 
Services in the event of a claim 
- Forensic services 
- Information costs  
- Crisis communication 
- Emergency costs 
Legal protection 
Disputes in connection with cyber risks 
- Contract law 
- Violation of personality rights 
- Misuse of identity 
- Misuse of credit cards and account information 
- Internet domain 
Cyber crime - Social engineering  
Financial losses due to deception by a third party 
- Fraud through the assumption of a false identity 
- Fraud through the diversion of cash flows 
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1.4. DEEP METAPHOR INTERVIEWS 
Consumer research has long focused on understanding cognitive structures, i.e., belief systems and emphasizing 
structure over content (Olson and Reynolds, 1983). However, a better term to describe and represent consumers 
is the mental model, which allows for non-belief-based representations, including attitudes, feelings, images, 
memories, values, etc. (Christensen and Olson, 2002). This is also more in line with the current cognitive 
neuroscience view that sees thoughts as image based (Damasio, 1994). Research and elicitation tools have 
evolved to attempt to capture the additional complexity of mental models – one of which is the Zaltman metaphor-
elicitation technique (ZMET). The theoretical assumption underlying ZMET is, in particular, the importance of 
unconscious tacit content, i.e., hidden knowledge and the importance of images in mental models. ZMET uses 
pictures to help informants identify and communicate content (Zaltman, 1997) and has been used to elicit the deeper 
emotional drivers of behavior and choice among consumers (Zaltman and Zaltman, 2008). 
The technique is based on three stages. First, respondents are asked to think about a topic and select pictures 
representing their thoughts and feelings on the topic. They are then interviewed to understand the meanings they 
assigned to the images, and connections to superordinate ideas are established using laddering probes. Finally, 
the findings are generated by creating consensus maps of central constructs and broad themes of meaning 
(Christensen and Olson, 2002). The final result is a set of themes that interviewees associate with the topic being 
researched. There is no attempt to generate statistically significant results; instead, the focus is on bringing hidden 
insights to the surface. The technique has been used in several studies, including by the authors of this study for 
consulting projects and in a published study to investigate the experience of new insurance customers. In that study, 
for example, new customers clearly signaled their frustration with the industry’s technical jargon and their lack of 
familiarity with insurance brands (Pugnetti and Bekaert, 2018).   
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1.5. METHODOLOGY 
We recruited three SMEs with activities related to mechanical engineering and conducted deep metaphors 
interviews with 17 volunteers across a broad cross-section of employee profiles in the organization, including 
management, administrative staff, shop floor, and field employees. Interviewees were asked to select 3-5 pictures 
describing how they felt when they heard reports of cyber attacks (Table 2). They were then interviewed about the 
meaning of the images chosen.  
 
Table 2: Research question 
Research Question How do you feel when you hear about cyber attacks? 
 
The interviews were conducted in September 2020 jointly by both authors and at each of the company premises. 
These lasted approximately one hour each, depending on the number of pictures used and the follow-up questions 
triggered by the discussion. The results were then discussed in a series of workshops and consolidated to generate 
the consensus maps and main themes presented. These themes are discussed in the following sections using the 
original pictures and language from the interviews. In a few instances, original images were replaced with similar 
pictures due to licensing issues.  
The interviewees described themselves as summarized in Table 3:1 
Table 3: Self-description of interviewees 
SELF-DESCRIPTION OF INTERVIEWEES 
1 Helpful, does not want to hurt anybody  10 Friendly, cares about others 
2 Person with positive outlook  11 Open but careful 
3 Quiet and thoughtful  12 Grounded but open 
4 Happy with life  13 Cautious 
5 Quiet, does not look for trouble  14 Good-natured, flexible 
6 Loyal, good listener  15 Conservative but open 
7 Positive person  16 In charge 
8 Goal-oriented  17 Communicative and curious 
9 Quiet and dependable    
 
                                                          
1 To preserve confidentiality, the order does not correspond to the order of the interviews  
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Results 
The interviews revealed several common threads. One repeated theme was the geopolitical nature of cyber attacks, 
links to organized crime, and the financial motivation. The hacker was seen as a “professional” with expert skills 
and excellent equipment, and not necessarily always a force for evil. In general, interviewees felt helpless to 
recognize cyber attacks or protect themselves. Consequently, they felt vulnerable yet aware of the dangers posed 
by phishing attacks, and appreciated the potentially catastrophic outcome of cyber attacks. Many mentioned the 
recent case at Meier Tobler. At the same time, they felt they were not important enough, nor their company large 
enough, to be targeted. In case of an emergency they would rely on external service providers to solve the problem. 
Finally, they revealed a very positive attitude towards problem-solving and finding solutions independently, including 
resorting to old-fashioned methods if necessary. 
 
Table 4: Common themes and picture labels 
 THEME PICTURE LABELS 
1 Global Politics and Organized Crime 
Secret service 
Man in the shadow 
The loot 
2 The Mythical Hacker 
The hacker 
Cool working space 
Villain or benefactor? 
3 Feeling Helpless 
Data magnet  
Social manipulation 
Unanswered questions 




5 Catastrophic Outcome 
Modern breaking and entering 
Attack on our supplier 
I hope not! 
6 It Does Not Concern Me 
The whole world 
Fear 
Personal support 
7 Proactive and Engaged 
Fog 
Planning 
Like in the old days 
   
These nuanced and multi-faceted responses to a relatively straightforward question indicate sophisticated thinking. 
This enabled the identification of several areas for improvement and the development of clear recommendations 
for Swiss SMEs and their service providers. 
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2.1. GLOBAL POLITICS AND ORGANIZED CRIME 
Cyber attacks were seen as part of a pattern of international intrigue and high-stakes, global, political games. 
Although several interviewees could name cyber attacks close to them or their company (overwhelmingly Meier 
Tobler, as discussed earlier), they generally placed cyber attacks in the context of international political 
confrontations. The US election and suspected Russian interference were often cited as examples, as was 
terrorism. Switzerland, however, was considered a safe haven, with a more stable political system. However, 
interviewees were aware that organized crime is a powerful and coordinating force behind cyber attacks. Successful 
attacks need the broad coordination of several specialists and data sources over time, requiring organization. 
Financial gain was identified as a driver of cyber attacks, with a desire for power occasionally mentioned. While the 
political component may make cyber crime seem relatively more remote, financial and criminal motives bring it 
closer, making it more recognizable and therefore more relevant to interviewees.  
 
Figure 2: Secret service 
 
SECRET SERVICE 
There are large shifts in the international power structure, and 
it is not so important if a few people die. Things are different in 
Switzerland, though, the whole system is safer. 
 
Figure 3: Man in the shadow 
 
MAN IN THE SHADOW 
It is not known who the person is, but it is clearly organized 
crime, the mafia. One can call the police or get out of the way, 
but it is too dangerous to confront him directly. 
 
Figure 4: The loot 
 
THE LOOT 
Money, a lot of money. At the end of the day the whole thing 
is about money. 
 
The tendency to associate cyber crime with large geopolitical forces while assuming Switzerland is a safe haven 
may make Swiss SMEs vulnerable. Employees may not be as alert as they should be. However, recognizing the 
role of organized crime and its associated financial motives is a positive sign.  
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2.2. THE MYTHICAL HACKER 
The person carrying out the actual attack was often referred to with the English word “hacker” and depicted as a 
hooded figure behind a computer. All interviewees indicated that a hacker would most likely not actually look like 
this and could be male or female. Hackers were seen as having considerable technical expertise and benefiting 
from well-equipped work spaces - better, in fact, than any of their intended victims. Hackers were not universally 
seen as a force for evil. Often they were identified as potential force for good – exposing pedophile rings and or 
corruption, for example. This differentiated view of hacking opens the door for ethical hackers to probe a company’s 
defenses in return for legitimate remuneration. 
 
Figure 5: The hacker 
 
THE HACKER 
Connected with several people in several countries. 
Anonymous and frightening. 
 
Figure 6: Cool working space 
 
COOL WORKING SPACE 
I don’t know why he has so many devices, but he uses all of 
them. He can even hack companies that are prepared and well 
protected. 
 
Figure 7: Villain or benefactor? 
 
VILLAIN OR BENEFACTOR? 
I feel neutral about it. Could be a criminal or a whistleblower. 
 
Interviewee responses confirmed an awareness of the complicated nature of cyber attacks and what drives them, 
as well as the potential benefits of whistleblowing activity. However, by linking attacks to larger geopolitical forces, 
they risk relegating cyber attacks to a context where they and their SMEs are “too insignificant” to attract unwelcome 
attention – automatically raising their vulnerability. 
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2.3. FEELING HELPLESS 
Interviewees spoke openly about the opaqueness of cyber attacks and their lack of understanding of the dynamics. 
Data can be mined without anyone noticing, like a magnet attracting ferrous metals. Attitudes towards cyber attacks 
can be influenced and manipulated over time without anyone noticing. Several questions are left unanswered - who 
is behind the attacks and why, and how you should react during or after an attack. The current, overall feeling is 
one of helplessness towards cyber attacks. This is not a positive sign, because it discourages active involvement 
and taking sensible defense measures. On the other hand, information campaigns and training programs to improve 
knowledge and awareness should find an interested and motivated audience. 
 
Figure 8: Data magnet 
 
DATA MAGNET 
Data can be pulled out of a network like a magnet that pulls 
everything towards itself. 
Figure 9: Social manipulation 
 
SOCIAL MANIPULATION 
Trust is being abused. If an employee is not paying attention 
they can make a mistake and can lose their job. 
 
Figure 10: Unanswered questions 
 
UNANSWERED QUESTIONS 
Why did he do that? What can we do? We cannot provide any 
answers or find any solutions by ourselves.  
 
Unfortunately, a feeling of helplessness triggers passivity, both in preparation for and in response to a cyber attack. 
Responsibility for cyber protection then shifts to more knowledgeable specialized third parties, rather than 
maintaining the focus on every employee’s role in safeguarding the company. Dedicated training programs need to 
be developed to raise awareness of risky behavior and knowledge of the tools available to make employees more 
proactive.  
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2.4. FEELING VULNERABLE 
Interviewees know that they are being watched when they are online. They do not like the feeling, and they do not 
like their inability to prevent themselves from being observed. They know that their trust can be abused to harm the 
companies they work for and that they can suffer directly or indirectly from this. One interviewee compared this to 
opening the door for an unknown person, who could then enter the building and steal equipment. In addition, we all 
have private lives and behaviors that we would not be proud of if they were made public or shared with a wider 
audience. This makes us vulnerable and unable to defend ourselves against an attack. Hackers exploit our 
vulnerability and gain access through phishing attacks designed to catch us off our guard. 
This feeling of vulnerability is unpleasant, and one common human reaction is to avoid thinking about it. As one 
interviewee said, “if we thought about all that could happen, we would never go online.” However, an awareness of 
the seriousness of phishing attacks is an encouraging indication of the level of knowledge employees already 
possess concerning cyber attacks and, therefore, a useful point of reference in training sessions. 
 
Figure 11: Surveillance 
 
SURVEILLANCE 
Somebody is looking over this young woman’s shoulder. She 
cannot prevent it. I do not like it when I have this feeling. 
Figure 12: Be careful! 
 
BE CAREFUL! 
This person is being blackmailed – something in his private 
history has been made public. He made a mistake on a social 
media platform. 
 
Figure 13: Phishing 
 
PHISHING 
Data are stolen through phishing attacks. You can try to 
protect yourself with antivirus and other programs, but that will 
not protect you against professionals.  
 
An awareness of being observed is a positive sign and can motivate a greater appreciation of risks and a more 
cautious approach when online. An understanding of the specific threat posed by phishing is significant and 
encouraging. Phishing is the most insidious way to exploit human vulnerabilities because it collects information and 
allows attackers to operate unseen and for a considerable time before striking. Effective measures to tackle phishing 
will need to involve educating people to respond to online requests with the appropriate caution.   
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2.5. CATASTROPHIC OUTCOME 
Respondents viewed cyber attacks as just another form of breaking and entering, and, like its physical counterpart, 
even an unsuccessful attempt is damaging and unsettling. The incident that crippled Meier Tobler, a supplier, raised 
awareness of the potentially catastrophic outcome of such an attack. While the company was eventually able to 
restore operations, the financial damage was significant, and the interviewees themselves were impacted in their 
daily business. Interestingly, while showing full support and understanding of their business partner’s problems, 
there was evident irritation and shortage of patience that the issues could not be resolved sooner. In general, there 
was a strong awareness of the potential for IT systems to be paralyzed and of the catastrophic impact this would 
have on the business. 
 
Figure 14: Modern breaking and entering 
 
MODERN BREAKING AND ENTERING 
Cyber is just a modern form of entering someone’s home. The 
normal protection is not enough to stop people from breaking 
in and there are damages regardless of what happens – at 
least a broken window. 
Figure 15: Attack on our supplier 
 
ATTACK ON OUR SUPPLIER 
Our supplier was fully automated and was attacked. It could 
no longer function and lost millions. The same thing might 
happen to us too.  
Figure 16: I hope not! 
 
I HOPE NOT!  
The whole thing can blow up in our faces.  
 
The awareness of the potential consequences of cyber attacks provides a clear entry point for training programs. It 
was also evident that goodwill towards trading partners affected by cyber attacks was limited, indicating that the 
recovery window before a long-term impact on the business relationships may be relatively short. In the event of an 
attack, it is therefore vital to restore business operations as swiftly as possible. 
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2.6. IT DOES NOT CONCERN ME 
While interviewees recognized their individual vulnerabilities, they also considered themselves of limited value and, 
therefore, unlikely to attract unwanted attention. To some extent, this thinking also applied to the company in which 
they worked. SMEs were viewed as too small when compared to multinationals. The interviews also revealed an 
underlying feeling that the dangers could be overstated and that fear of attack might prompt unnecessary and 
possibly detrimental protective action. However, if the company were attacked, external service providers would 
provide solutions and expertise to tackle the problem, in much the same way as good nurse in a well-equipped 
hospital treats sick patients. This comparison, in particular, suggests a potential systemic weakness. We readily 
place ourselves in the care of doctors and nurses and would not self-medicate if we were seriously unwell. Similarly, 
we may assume it is automatically better to leave digital security solely in the hands of specialists.  
 
Figure 17: The whole world 
 
THE WHOLE WORLD 
As soon as the plug goes in, the whole world is connected and 
we have access to the all the knowledge. A very positive 
change. 
Figure 18: Fear 
 
FEAR 
Unfounded fear of anything happening online, although we are 
relatively safe. Too much protection is not necessary. 
 
Figure 19: Personal support 
 
PERSONAL SUPPORT 
This is how a company feels when it’s under attack – like 
somebody who is sick and needs external experts and 
specialized equipment to be treated.  
 
The notion of being too small and insignificant to be targeted by cyber criminals is perhaps the most worrying aspect 
of how many SME employees think. While individuals may not be the ultimate target of an attack, they can 
unwittingly be the weakest link in the chain if cyber criminals can access a company’s systems through them. Small 
SMEs may not be in the direct line of fire, but they can still be targets of opportunity for criminals. Over-reliance on 
third-party expertise may also shift the problem and its solution away from individual responsibility, further limiting 
awareness and responsiveness in the event of a cyber attack. 
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2.7. PROACTIVE AND ENGAGED 
When discussing potential attacks and operational disruptions, interviewees demonstrated a remarkable range of 
reactions. Rather than being paralyzed, they displayed their enthusiasm for tackling the problem and moving 
forward. Thus a foggy road - signaling limited information - became a metaphor for finding the right path in spite of 
the adversity, and a blank road sign became the symbol for the need to develop a solution. Multiple tools based on 
older technologies and workflows can be utilized to keep the company operating in case of a disruption. 
 
Figure 20: Fog 
 
FOG 
During cyber attacks everything is unclear, but I want to move 
forward along the path, find the way to a solution. I am not 
scared by what is hiding in the fog, but have to move carefully 
in order to not lose the path. 
Figure 21: Planning 
 
PLANNING 
You have to label the signs yourself, and there is no standard 
solution. The signs point in different directions because you 
can always have different solutions to the problem. Perhaps 
you have to use your personal mobile phone if the company’s 
systems are down. 
Figure 22: Like in the old days 
 
LIKE IN THE OLD DAYS 
During the attack on our supplier we went back to telephone, 
pen and paper, like in the old days. It worked reasonably well, 
except that all accounting information was stored in the 
system. 
 
This proactive mindset and desire to keep moving is a great asset for SMEs. Rather than waiting for external IT 
service providers to restore normal operations, employees wanted to help keep the business operational. With 
some planning and training, Swiss SMEs should be able to develop an offline workflow relying on employee 
cooperation, energy, and motivation. This would avoid sudden and critical stoppages in their interactions with clients 
and increase their ability to withstand a cyber attack. 
 
20    PUGNETTI AND CASIÁN - Cyber Risks and Swiss SMEs 
Discussion 
The employees we interviewed communicated a nuanced and differentiated set of emotions when thinking about 
and discussing cyber attacks. Unsurprisingly, these diverse emotions were inconsistent, yet coexisted in the minds 
of the group. They can be grouped into seven main themes that apply to some extent to all interviewees. Each 
theme has been discussed individually in Section 2. Some issues can be further differentiated by specific employee 
characteristics, and these are discussed in the following section. Further, we have also been able to develop 
actionable recommendations for SMEs and their service providers. 
 
3.1. IMPACT BY EMPLOYEE CATEGORY 
During the interviews, we noticed some additional indications of differing attitudes depending on employee category. 
Both the categories and the differences are purely anecdotal and reflect our observations rather than theoretical or 
fundamental insights. Nonetheless, we feel they offer added value to our discussion. 
3.1.1. Administrative vs. Shop-Floor 
The first difference we observed was between administrative, desk-bound employees and those working on the 
shop floor or at clients’ sites. Shop-floor employees typically have only limited access to IT systems – mostly linked 
to manufacturing systems – and therefore, in general, feel less directly impacted by cyber attacks. Administrative 
employees, on the other hand, are keenly aware of the consequences of such problems. They can recall instances 
when their systems were down for extended periods or the impact of the attack on Meier Tobler on their own work. 
As a result, administrative employees should be willing to support the development of fallback processes and to 
practice them regularly. 
3.1.2. Young vs. Old    
Another potential difference – and one suggested by several interviewees – is between younger and older 
employees, the implication being that older people may be more vulnerable to attacks than younger ones. Younger 
employees were clearly more familiar with digital technology and more active on social media platforms. Older 
employees reported that they had not grown up with the technology and it still felt unfamiliar. Consequently, they 
were more cautious in their approach - possibly more aware of suspicious messages, more reluctant to engage, 
and more willing to ask for advice when unsure, especially in a business setting. While it is not possible to discern 
the actual relative risk profile, the interviewee responses suggest that these differences may not be significant. 
Younger employees are more familiar with the technology and hence more aware of the risks, but older employees 
tend to compensate for their lack of familiarity with greater caution. 
3.1.3. Experts vs. Newbies 
A similar but distinct potential categorization is according to the level of digital expertise. This showed some 
correlation with age, but very different self-described expertise levels were evident within the younger cohort. The 
more knowledgeable employees were also more confident about their ability to detect and recover from cyber 
attacks. They also tended to view any potential loss as small. Less knowledgeable employees tended to protect 
themselves by limiting their online exposure and only using specific platforms (e.g., e-banking) where they felt a 
third party provided appropriate security. While it is difficult to determine the true impact of these differences, it is 
not clear whether greater confidence translates into a lower potential vulnerability. Employees who, subjectively, 
feel more knowledgeable - and are, therefore, more confident - may engage in less risk-averse behavior expose 
themselves to greater danger. 
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3.1.4. Business vs. Personal 
A further differentiation concerns individual behavior and appears to be influenced by the setting (e.g., working on 
the company’s email system or a personal device). Interviewees stated that they were more cautious in a business 
setting, partly due to external/customer interactions and partly because they felt the potential for damage was 
greater. Business settings also tended to be more complex, with conversations often featuring the names of 
unknown customers and partners, again prompting greater care. Several employees mentioned fraudulent emails 
from fake clients or vendors, so defenses tended to be high. The interviews indicated a less vigilant approach in a 
personal setting. This was at least partly because respondents believed they could spot suspicious names or 
threads more easily and because most interviewees did not consider themselves important enough to warrant a 
cyber attack. This distinction may pose a threat if this more relaxed attitude is transferred to a business setting or if 
personal devices are breached and used to compromise business systems. The likelihood of this threat further 
increases when employees are regularly required to work from home, as is the case, for example, during the current 
corona pandemic. 
 
3.2. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT 
Our recommendations for improvement are based on a few unambiguous observations from the interviews. In 
general, employees are motivated and proactive; however, they often view cyber threats as a problem for 
specialists. Specialists are indeed necessary, but everyone can participate in developing solutions and recovering 
from an attack. Furthermore, it is not clear the extent to which employees are aware of the risk and potential 
consequences to their organization. In light of this, we recommend three key areas for improvement. These 
improvements can be carried out autonomously by the companies or by service providers as part of their offering. 
These recommendations are complementary to the standard advice for companies to secure their infrastructure 
and work to mitigate the severity of potential attacks. Infrastructure should be strengthened with adequate firewalls 
as well as physical and password security, and an emergency response and recovery plan developed. The severity 
of an attack can be controlled by recognizing and protecting the company’s most valuable assets, the so-called 
“crown jewels”. These are often proprietary data, customer information, and production equipment. The 
recommendations from this study are designed to augment this general advice, specifically in the case of SMEs. 
3.2.1. Raise Awareness 
Employees seem to be aware of both the potentially catastrophic consequences of cyber attacks as well as their 
own vulnerability, especially to phishing attempts. At the same time, they view their company as too insignificant to 
warrant an attack. Cyber attacks are also considered part of a global political struggle rather than as something 
closer to home. Of course, this attitude is dangerous, and there are national statistics and several well-publicized 
cases to serve as a warning. Such information needs to be communicated directly and consistently to employees. 
In addition, employees should be informed regularly about the number of unsuccessful attacks on the company’s 
IT infrastructure while being reminded of what the company is doing (e.g., upgrading firewalls) to protect itself. They 
also need to be reminded of the simple habits they need to adopt to reduce risk. Companies should also test their 
system defenses and human vulnerabilities, perhaps using ethical hackers - if they can afford the outlay - since 
employees are sympathetic to hackers who work for the greater good. These findings should then be communicated 
to employees to emphasize the importance of their role safeguarding the company.  
3.2.2. Empower Employees 
There is a widespread view that hackers are highly knowledgeable and well equipped, that the cyber world is 
complex, and that specialized service providers are the principal line of defense. While this is true to some extent, 
and professional service providers are part of an effective protection and response system, they cannot function in 
isolation. Outsourcing responsibility for cyber security to a third party invites complacency on the part of the 
employees, whose online behavior constitutes a vital defense line against attacks. SME employees also tend to be 
proactive and want to join the fight. Beyond raising awareness in their role, employees should be encouraged to 
participate in the discovery and communication of attacks and be recruited to develop solutions (see Section 3.2.3 
below). External service providers should be asked to instruct employees and involve them as much as possible. 
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3.2.3. Train a Recovery Mode 
In the event of an attack, or more commonly, a system malfunction, employees may not know how to respond. Their 
reactions, however, should not be improvised or ad-hoc. Such scenarios should be planned in advance, with 
supporting tools provided, and predefined triggers to emergency procedures clearly defined. Our interviews 
indicated that especially customer billing information and technical product specifications can be difficult to access 
when working offline, and this needs to be addressed carefully. 
The development of a no-IT scenario can also be an opportunity for teambuilding and for leveraging the expertise 
of every employee. For example, companies can introduce a workshop where employees attempt to carry out their 
everyday jobs without regular IT tools. In this way, they will soon discover what information is vital and needs to be 
made available through offline systems, what tasks can be carried out on personal devices and what needs to be 
paper based. Such tools can then be developed during normal operations and regularly tested through “live-fire” 
exercises when business is conducted without the standard IT infrastructure. The recovery mode operation should 
have exact, predetermined triggers based on the system being affected and the outage duration. 
 
Figure 23: Recommendations for improvement 







TRAIN A RECOVERY MODE 
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Conclusions 
Cyber attacks are a significant and growing issue, and Swiss SMEs are not an exception to this development. There 
has been a growth in targeted ransomware attacks in recent years. More generally, malware attacks have 
increasingly affected Swiss SMEs. Besides a well-conceived and up-to-date technological infrastructure, employee 
awareness and alert online behavior are critical components of any defense mechanism since cyber attacks 
typically begin with an infiltration of IT systems through phishing attacks. These attacks exploit human weaknesses 
to obtain passwords and other critical information. Phishing occurs almost continuously, and there is often an 
interval of several months between a successful phishing attempt and the actual attack, making tracing and 
feedback to employees difficult. The “normal” level of awareness and online behavior of employees is, therefore, 
the most significant indicator of vulnerability to phishing attacks 
For this study, we interviewed several employees from three Swiss SMEs to understand their views on cyber 
attacks. Our research relied on deep metaphors to understand the emotions and the hidden drivers of employee 
behavior towards the threat of cyber crime. The responses were combined into common themes highlighting the 
broad ranges of thoughts and emotions associated with the digital world. Employees viewed cyber attacks in the 
broader context of global politics while recognizing the purely financial, criminal motives behind most attacks. They 
viewed hackers as skilled and well-equipped operatives but did not always see them as a negative force. They felt 
vulnerable and helpless when facing cyber attacks, and recognized the potential damage they can cause. At the 
same time, they tended to view their company and themselves as too small to be targeted and relied on third parties 
for protection in case of an attack. Fundamentally, however, they were proactive and interested in working towards 
practical solutions. 
We have offered three actionable suggestions for SMEs to improve on existing, general recommendations for cyber 
security. These leverage the positive elements of the prevailing SME culture and address the riskier ones. Further 
information to raise awareness is necessary, as is the provision of appropriate tools, to accompany the shift towards 
a more direct ownership by the employees of the problems and their solutions. Further, companies need to plan for 
and train operations in the event of a system breakdown. Additional research should investigate whether there are 
any differences between employees who respond to phishing attacks and those who do not, whether employees of 
large organizations have similar attitudes towards cyber security, and whether the measures we suggest here 
mitigate the threat of cyber attacks. 
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